# Financing minerals exploration in Chile

## The Economic Governance Mechanism in Venture Capital Funds

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### Economic governance


- Attempted definition support of economic activity and economic transactions by protecting
  - property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide the needed physical and organizational infrastructure (Dixit).
- Various agency problems to do with corporations
  - (shareholders v. managers, hierarchies of management and workers) and their resolution by explicit or implicit contracts

## Economic governance


- □ Connected because the boundary of a firm is itself endogenous (Coase, Williamson).
  - If governance of arm's length contracts is poor, that raises the transaction costs of using the market and therefore favors integration
  - Vertical for transactions in intermediate inputs, and horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate for internal financing
  - This can explain the large family owned conglomerates in LDCs (Dixit)

# Financing minerals exploration Venture Stock Exchange 17-2-1

Figura 1: Negocio de exploración



## Venture capital funds



### VC Mechanism

- VC funds are highly specialised and focused in one specific area
- They share a common structure which creates the governance mechanism
- Depending on the degree of information asymmetries different kind of rights are allocated, regardless on the amount of capital invested and depending on performance (state contingency)
- Investors provide capital in return of a right proportional to the amount invested
- VC's are responsible of investing the capital in the best projects and their payment is given by the value they can create giving support, extertise and monitoring the venture
- Entropropoura progent their projects to UC's

# Overcoming information asymmetries

Venture Capitalist's		
Concerns	Solution by contract	
(Agency Problems)		
The Entrepreneur will not work hard to maximize value after investment is made.	VC will make the entrepreneur's compensation strongly dependant on performance.	
The Entrepreneur knows more about his or her quality/ability than the VC.	VC can design contracts with greater pay-for-performance that good entrepreneurs will be more willing to accept.	
After the investment is made there will be circumstances when the VC disagrees with the entrepreneur and the VC will want the right to make	Control theories show that the solution is to give control to the VC in some states and to the entrepreneur in others.	
The Entrepreneur knows more about his or her quality/ability than the VC ("Hold up" problem).	VC can reduce the entrepreneur's incentive to leave by vesting the entrepreneur's shares.	

Chilean structure of investment funds

Type of Fund	Capital Invested [mUS\$]	Market Share [%]
Debt Funds, mostly invested in debt obligations, such as treasury bonds, corporate bonds and	4,970	74.4
Real Estate Funds, mostly invested in shares of construction companies, mortgage debts and	1,300	19.5
Privaters Funds, mostly invested in small companies with high returns expectations and high risk.	172	2.6
Other Funds	236	3.5
TOTAL	6,678	100.0

## Investments limits for institutional investors in Chile

Maximum capital's availability	Rough estimate [mUS\$]
Pension Funds  • 1% of C and D Funds  • 3% of A and B Funds	2,000
Banks  • 1% of the assets	2,200
<ul> <li>Insurance Companies</li> <li>10% of the investments of insurance companies</li> </ul>	110
CORFO  • 40% of the shares of a venture capital fund, with a limit of 2.000.000 UTM	150
TOTAL	~ 4,500

#### Developing a minerals exploration VC fund

## Challenges and solutions

financing

Aspect

Main difficulties

Estimate projects that could need

Demand for capital	<ul><li>Poor rotation of land rights</li><li>Poor regional geological</li></ul>	To raise rights costs in time and make it contingents on a business
	information •Exploration rights owners that not	plan To give the entrepreneur more
Regulations	Venture capital fund has to invest in ventures with 5 years of existence  Due to tributary benefits, most of the ventures are organised as a	from one kind to another, at all the effects the new partnership is continuer of the old one.  If that is not acceptable, the VCF
IPO availability	"mining contractual partnership". The Santiago stock exchange might not be suitable for liquidation of ventures because is not big	could buy an older shell company. IPO's in any other stock exchange, such as the AIM, ASX or TSX.
Supply of capital	enough. Even though the estimate of capital supply seems to be enough to start, most institutional investors can't be attracted.	Investors are not attracted because there are strong information asymmetries. Standardising the information on mineral deposits, building a good reputation and implementing a


Solution found

rights

Incentives for exploration

owners to explore

# VC Mechanism for improving governance in Senior Companies



#### Conclusions

- VC funds specialised in minerals exploration seems a good alternative to provide financing.
- □ Their governance mechanism can overcome information asymmetries in a betterv way than VSX
- The role of institutional investors as main providers of venture capital is crucial
- Knowledge, reputation and good incentives are core assets for the VC's
- CORFO can play an important role to start the industry